CHAPTER 6
THE DEVELOPMENT ETHICS FRAMEWORK

An excerpt from *Displaced by Development: Ethics and Responsibilities,*
by Peter Penz, Jay Drydyk, and Pablo Bose

In this chapter we will identify six values that have come to frame debates over *ethical development* over the past 50 years. Then in Chapter 7 we will assess how well current guidelines screen for development that serves these values badly. While recognizing that debate goes on about the theoretical meaning and practical implications of these values, we will make one particular value our "trump." This is the value of non-maleficence, which (put crudely) means: minimize harm. Therefore, our ethical assessment of DID policy will not be dependent on any particular theory of ethics or political philosophy, though we accept input from such theories where it is appropriate. To the relativist's question, "Whose values matter?" our response is: anyone who might think about development policy in a non-maleficent way.

Six core values have emerged in the second half of the twentieth century, and now in the twenty-first, as being crucial for development. They all affect how we may answer the question, "What must development be, for it to be worthwhile?" And they all leave open considerable room for debate about how they ought to be realized. It may come to be recognized in future that other values must join the list. For now, though, there seem to be six: human well-being and security, equity, empowerment, human rights, cultural freedom, and environmental sustainability. This list also implies six ways in which development can go wrong, ethically: by damaging or failing to enhance human well-being or security, by being inequitable, by being unfree or undemocratic, by failing to uphold or enhance human rights, by diminishing or imperilling cultural freedom, and by being environmentally unsustainable.

1. Human well-being and human security

(a) Human well-being.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s 'development' was commonly held to mean 'improvement in material well-being'[1], of which GDP per capita was regarded as an appropriate measure. However, it was clear to many who used GDP per capita as an indicator of development that it captured well-being quite poorly.[2] It includes investment goods as well as consumption goods, it ignores non-market goods, it underweights consumption of necessities by the poor as compared with more expensive consumption by higher-income groups, and it includes the value of what are costs rather than benefits, such as commuter travel, waste disposal, policing, the legal system, and the operation of

[1] Bernard Okun and Richard W. Richardson, "Economic Development: Concepts and Meaning," in *Studies in Economic Development*, eds. Bernard Okun and Richard W. Richardson. Anonymous (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), 230.
[2] *Ibid.,* pp. 231-234.

armed forces.[3] Some who recognized this gap between GDP per capita and well-being attempted to devise better development indicators that more closely tracked well-being, such as the Physical Quality of Life Index[4] or, later, the Human Development Index.[5] Here we are concerned not with these indices *per se,* but with their ethical implications. If there is a gap between GDP per capita and PQLI or HDI, the consequence is that, between two countries or regions, one could have higher GDP per capita while other measures higher in quality of life – based on indicators such as life expectancy, caloric intake and child mortality, education and literacy. Which, then, has the higher level of development? Insofar as development is worth having, it should enable people to live longer and fuller lives. A process of economic expansion that is damaging to people's well-being (as was notoriously true of early industrialization) is not desirable as a social goal. This has an important consequence for the meaning of 'development': insofar as the term is used to advocate processes of social or economic change, those processes of change must be conducive rather than damaging to human well-being. For those who advocate development, then, well-being becomes an essential value, essential to the worth and justifiability of the development enterprise as a whole. If development is to be a worthy social goal, 'development' cannot mean just economic growth. In addition, human well-being must be enhanced, and when we speak of 'development' as a goal we seek for our societies, this must be included in what we mean. Processes of economic expansion or construction that are damage or fail to enhance human well-being constitute *maldevelopment.*

This connection between valuable development and human well-being is quite explicit in idea of *human development* that was articulated and made prominent by Human Development Index co-founder Mahbub ul Haq, who reflected on the evolution of this perspective in the following way:

> The lack of recognition given to people as an end of development is … glaring. Only in the past two decades have we started focusing on who development is for, looking beyond growth in gross national product (GNP). For the first time, we have begun to acknowledge – still with a curious reluctance – that in many societies GNP can increase while human lives shrivel. … We have finally begun to accept the axiom that human welfare – not GNP – is the true end of development.[6]

This conception of development finds *prima facie* support from non-maleficence in two ways. One line of argument concerns development that causes harm, while the other concerns neglect. People use 'development' in a normative way when they advocate it and attempt to enlist the support of others. Notoriously, there have been processes of economic growth and construction of infrastructure that have caused significant harm. The industrialization of Europe is one example, but dam and infrastructure projects that impoverish the communities they displace furnish many

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[3] Des Gasper, *The Ethics of Development; From Economism to Human Development,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 40.

[4] M. D. Morris, *Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical Quality of Life Index,* (New York: Pergamon, 1979)

[5] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1990,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)

[6] Mahbub ul Haq, *Reflections on Human Development,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4.

others. To include these processes within the class of development projects that one advocates is *prima facie* inconsistent with the principle, "Do no harm." This may raise the counterargument that greater harm would be permitted by neglecting to build infrastructure and to industrialize. Still, in retrospect, infrastructure as well as industrial projects could have been carried out without harming as many, as deeply. At the very least, then, this superfluous harm does not need to be condoned, nor should can it be condoned consistently by those who are committed to seeing harms reduced overall, over time. The scope of 'development' that can be advocated in this way must attend to human well-being at least in saying that processes of economic and infrastructure expansion that cause superfluous harm should be counted as maldevelopment, not as the sort of development that responsible people can advocate.

A similar argument can be made concerning development policies and strategies that neglect human well-being by failing to provide adequately for the worst-off. Policy and strategy choices can always be framed in terms of alternatives, and doing nothing is always an alternative. If, compared to the alternatives, there is one strategy that will more effectively reduce the hardships that are endured by the worst-off, then people who are committed to non-maleficence should favour that strategy over the alternatives (other things being equal). Otherwise, the consequence of their choice would be to tolerate the continuation of avoidable harm, which cannot be advocated responsibly under the banner of 'development'. To carry out development strategies and policies that preserve and tolerate avoidable harm must therefore count as maldevelopment.

There are two caveats. First, it can be difficult to draw these distinctions on a project-by-project basis due to imperfect information about the consequences of stopping a project versus going ahead. In the case of dam projects, for example, benefits promised for projects often turn out to be exaggerated and harms understated; on the other hand, determining what further development would not be feasible if this (dam) project had not gone through can be a matter of sheer speculation. Would the US aircraft industry not have developed as it did in the state of Washington, without electrical power capacity provided by the Grand Coulee Dam?[7] In that case, would the software industry not have settled there forty years later? The second caveat is that non-maleficence does not compel us to favour the worst off in all cases. In that sense, it is not strictly speaking *prioritarian.* We can imagine a utopia, for instance, in which the worst-off have a quality of life that is not much different than anyone else and this difference is either temporary or somehow under their control. If the difference is not on the whole harmful, we are not required to oppose it on grounds of non-maleficence. The important questions are whether the worst-off are harmed, and whether these harms are avoidable. If so, then, other things being equal, non-maleficence forbids us to accept this and demands action to remedy it. (What sort of remedy, of course, will be a matter of further debate, in which non-maleficence on its own may not provide much guidance.) Still, in general terms, non-maleficence will favour policies and strategies that are prioritarian with regard to harm – i.e., that give significant priority to reducing the avoidable harm that is endured by those people who are worst-off.

Thus, in addition to avoiding processes of economic and social expansion that are

[7] World Commission on Dams, *Dams and Development; A New Framework for Decision-Making,* (London: Earthscan, downloadable from www.dams.org, 2000)

damaging to human well-being, development, normatively considered, favours strategies and policies that promote well-being, especially the well-being of those who are worst-off. Projects and strategies that serve this value well constitute the sort of development that is worth pursuing, while those that disserve it are to be regarded ethically as maldevelopment.

This does not end discussion so much as to frame it. It raises, for one thing, a nest of competing conceptions of well-being. Attending to the harms endured by the worst-off seems to favour the idea of attending to their needs, or arguably their basic needs. Policy debate on a basic-needs approach to development took place in the 1970s (see next section); it was eclipsed in the neo-conservative heyday of the 1980s but revived theoretically in the 1990s. Arguably the Millenium Development Goals are the current policy expression of a basic needs approach.[8]

The theoretical shift moved from a psychological conception of needs as mental states central to human motivation towards a less psychological, more pragmatic conception of needs as requisite means for achieving basic human goals.[9] Doyal and Gough represented needs as having a tree-like structure beginning, and at root level, “health and autonomy are the basic needs which humans must satisfy in order to avoid the serious harm of fundamentally impaired participation in their form of life.”[10] Branching out from here are intermediate needs requisite to achieving health and agency, such as adequate nutrition, shelter, non-hazardous environments, adequate health care, security in childhood, significant primary relationships, physical security, economic security, safe birth control and childbearing, and basic education. Four basic social functions are identified as preconditions for meeting needs, namely production, reproduction, cultural transmission, and the exercise of political authority, and these may function well or badly, insofar as they are conducive or unconducive to the meeting of needs. Doyal and Gough argue that there is a right not only to minimal but to optimal satisfaction of these basic needs and of the intermediate needs to which they give rise.[11] They survey a vast array of social indicators that could be developed to measure the degree to which various needs are met, and to which they are well served by the social functions on which they rely.

The capability approach founded by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum sought to provide different theoretical underpinnings for indicators of well-being. It begins with an approach to well-being that is activity-oriented, in that well-being is conceived not in terms of subjective feelings of satisfaction, nor in terms of preference-satisfaction; rather the starting point is with “functionings” – that is to say, activities or aspects of how a person lives, or as Sen has put it more simply, “the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life.”[12] Among these, some have great relevance to whether we are living well or badly; others (the brand of dish detergent that I use) have little

[8] Gasper, *The Ethics of Development; From Economism to Human Development,*

[9] *Ibid.,* pp. 134-142.

[10] Len Doyal and Ian Gough, *A Theory of Human Need,* (New York: Guilford Press, 1991)

[11] *Ibid.,* p. 111.

[12] Amartya Sen, "Capability and Well-Being," in *The Quality of Life*, eds. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. Anonymous (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1993), 31.

relevance, if any. The central assumption of the capability approach is that there are specific types of functioning that people themselves have good reasons to value, as part of living well, and functioning in these ways constitutes well-being. (The "reason to value" aspect signals that knowledge of well-being must be rooted in people's own experience, but under critical, rational scrutiny on their part as well as on the part of outside observers.) As to specific functionings that people have reason to value, Sen typically mentions "such elementary things as being adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and premature mortality, etc., to more complex achievements such as being happy, having self-respect, and taking part in the life of the community." If we are concerned with well-being, then, our focus should be on the levels of functioning which people are *capable* of achieving. Such capabilities may be limited by restrictions on their liberty (as women have been restricted from taking part freely and fully in public life) but also by circumstances and conditions that limit their opportunity. Income is one of these, but by no means the only one. Capability to stay healthy is of course affected by poverty, but it may also be affected by the inaccessibility of health treatment facilities. Hence it may be the case that people with higher incomes may have lower capabilities, illustrated by the fact that African-American males in the US have higher incomes but lower life expectancies than males in the Indian state of Kerala.[13] The capability to function in those ways that people have reason to value, as components of living well, is what Sen calls "well-being freedom". He notes that while well-being freedom should be a central concern of social policy, it is not the only concern, as people also have reason to value their freedom to achieve goals of their own, quite apart from their impact on well-being, and this Sen calls "agency freedom". Nevertheless, well-being freedom, which must indeed include some agency freedom as part of a good life, is the main focus of the capability approach. This supports a conception of well-being that, as Sen notes "has a generic similarity to the common concern with 'quality of life,' which too concentrates on the way human life goes (perhaps even the choices one has) and not just on the resources or income that a person commands."[14] One of Martha Nussbaum's most salient contributions to this approach has been to recognize the value of achievements and functionings that have often been ignored, even by theorists of needs and basic needs. Her provisional list of ten central human capabilities includes capabilities of senses, imagination, thought, emotions, and practical reason; it includes not only capabilities to achieve self-esteem and social respect, but also capabilities of affiliation, *i.e.,* to live with and care for others; it includes play, but also control over one's social environment (both political and material).[15]

We noted that when strategies of development-as-growth were criticized for failing to enhance well-being, the critics' conception of well-being was "prioritarian" in the attention it gave to the well-being of the worst-off. So too for well-being freedom: the implicit emphasis is generally on reducing the greatest "substantive unfreedoms" or "deprivations of freedom." Indeed that is Sen's normative conception of development:

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[13] Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom,* (New York: Knopf, 1999), 21-24.
[14] *Ibid,* p. 24.

[15] Martha Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development; The Capabilities Approach,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 78-80.

"The removal of substantial unfreedoms, it is argued here, is *constitutive* of development."[16] This is applied to the policy context by conceiving poverty as "capability deprivation" rather than as lowness of income.[17] We return to this in the next section.

The different conceptions of well-being that are held by advocates of basic needs and capabilities should not obscure the broad value on which they agree – along with earlier critics of development as growth – namely, that if development is to be a worthy social goal, it must entail the enhancement of well-being, especially for those who endure the greatest hardships. Accordingly, to expand production or infrastructure without doing this is to be regarded as maldevelopment.

(b) Human security.

Much as "human development" advocates distinguished their approach from others as being "people-centred," so have advocates of "human security". Implicitly, human security is meant to be contrasted with state security. Negative contrast is that states can remain secure against attack while their people's lives are subject to great insecurity; in some cases (such as fascism, colonialism, or apartheid) it has been secure states that have made their people's lives insecure. More positively, "human security" is also used to name a foreign policy perspective according to which inter-state tensions can be reduced if people's security within their borders is enhanced.

In addition to this superficial resemblance – that both "human security" and "human development" have been advocated as "people-centred," there is also a deeper connection. Insofar as it is a worthy goal, development involves enhancing human well-being (giving priority to reducing hardships) in ways that are equitable and empowering. It seems almost too obvious for words that the intent of ethical development that people may improve their lives. But a focus on improvement may be misleading if it leads us to ignore the need for protection against *downside risks.* The concept of human security highlights this need for downside protection, and in this way it is a necessary complement for the concept of development, as the Final Report of the Commission on Human Security explains:

> Human security and human development are both fundamentally concerned with the lives of human beings—longevity, education, opportunities for participation. Both are concerned with the basic freedoms that people enjoy. But they look out on shared goals with different scopes. Human development "is about people, about expanding their choices to lead lives they value". It has an optimistic quality, since it focuses on expanding opportunities for people so that progress is fair—"growth with equity". Human security complements human development by deliberately focusing on "downside risks". It recognizes the conditions that menace survival, the continuation of daily life and the dignity of human beings.[18]

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[16] Sen, *Development as Freedom,* xii, 15.

[17] *Ibid,* Chapter 4, pp. 87-110; *Inequality Reexamined,* Ch. 7, pp. 102-116.

[18] Commission on Human Security, *Human Security Now,* Anonymous (New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003) The source of the sentence quoted within this paragraph is United Nations

The lists of downside risks to which the concept of human security refers can be quite extensive. While risks of conflict and violence are important, so are other risks to human well-being. In human rights terms, the concept of human security combines the notions of security of person and social security. An earlier *Human Development Report* identified seven dimensions of human security:

- Economic security
- Food security
- Health security
- Environmental security
- Personal security
- Community security
- Political security[19]

We list these for illustrative purposes only; no such list is definitive. On the contrary, it would probably be shortsighted not to keep such lists open. As an example, community security is meant to address threats of ethnic conflict, of which the *Human Development Report 1994* cites death tolls from particularly "brutal conflicts."[20] However, the threats arising to individuals from ethnic or communal conflict are not merely physical. People subjected to injury in such conflict are subjected to indignities and contempt, before and after; since they go hand in hand, human security must pertain to these as well.

Nevertheless, even if the categories of human security must remain open, some useful distinctions can be drawn. One is that human security threats may be either sudden or chronic. Examples of sudden threats and disruptions would include epidemics, economic recessions, or outbreaks of violence. Parallel examples of chronic threats would be: endemic health risks due to pollution or sanitation; chronic unemployment, hunger, and homelessness; or prolonged repression. Downside risks might disrupt peoples lives by suddenly lowering their health status or standard of living; on the other hand, they may involve continued subjection to ill health or deprivation.[21] It is also useful to distinguish between protective strategies and empowerment strategies. Safety from threats is preserved or restored in the first case by governments or international actors, and in the latter case by enhancing people's capabilities to act on their own behalf.[22]

There are cases of economic expansion that have undermined human insecurity, some intentionally, such as the American slave economy or the industrial strategy of *apartheid* South Africa. In other cases, economic expansion may generate unplanned conflict along lines of class or ethnicity, or through competition for control of resources. It should take no deep ethical reflection to recognize that such forms of expansion must be excluded from the sorts of development that we regard as worthwhile. Therefore

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Development Programme, Human Development Report 2002 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 13.

[19] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994; New Dimensions of Human Security,* (1994: Oxford University Press, 1994), 24-25.

[20] *Ibid.,* p. 32.

[21] *Ibid.,* p. 23.

[22] *Human Security Now,* p. 10.

human security must be regarded as a value of worthwhile development and, accordingly, economic expansion that is damaging to human security must be regarded as maldevelopment.

2. Equity

A second value that has come to be seen as essential to development is equity. Even some otherwise orthodox development economists who conceived of development as growth had qualms about including cases of inequitable growth. Okun and Richardson noted in the early 1960s that per capita income is "a misleading index of the state of development or the economic welfare of a country" because it takes no account of distribution. As an example they cite Kuwait, "which has an exceedingly high level of per capita income but which, by no stretch of the imagination, can be considered a developed country," inasmuch as per capita income is inflated by oil royalties that accrue to the ruling family while "almost the entire population lives in poverty".[23]

There are three different conceptions of inequity at play: unequal sharing in benefits, imposition or preservation of hardships, and unjust social inequalities.

i. Unequal sharing in benefits. Unequal sharing in benefits of economic growth is well exemplified by the Okun and Richardson Kuwaiti example. It is also what Dudley Seers had in mind in his well-known address on "The Meaning of Development," when he objected, "One cannot really say that there has been development for the world as a whole, when the benefits of technical progress have accrued to minorities which were already relatively rich, whether we are speaking of rich minorities within nations or the minority of nations which are rich."[24] Specifically he held that economic expansion should be counted as development only insofar as it involved reductions in poverty, unemployment, and inequality of income.[25] A 1973 study by Adelman and Morris is perhaps best known for its empirical findings not only that "economic modernization shifts the income distribution in favour of the middle class and upper income groups and against lower income groups" but also that growth "is accompanied by an absolute as well as a relative decline in the average income of the very poor." As recognition of these trends suffused throughout the development community, including the World Bank, the result was that "the very idea of aggregate growth as a social objective has increasing been called into question."[26] Adelman and Morris drew the implicit conclusion from this, insisting that social justice is essential to development, insofar as development is to be a worthy social policy goal. They make explicit that "The fundamental values on which our recommendations are based are: (1) that a major goal of development policy and planning should be to guarantee social justice to those in need, and (2) that any pattern of economic growth is unjust that fails to improve the standard of living of major segments of the population."[27] Their reference to need, however, draws them close to a second

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[23] Okun and Richardson, *Economic Development: Concepts and Meaning,* 233.
[24] Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," *International Development Review* (1969): 6.
[25] *Ibid.,* p. 5.
[26] Hollis Chenery, Montek Ahluwalia, and C. L. G. Bell, *Redistribution with Growth: Policies to Improve Income Distribution in Developing Countries in the Context of Economic Growth,* (Oxford University Press: London, 1974), xiii.
[27] Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, *Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries,* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1973), 192.

conception of inequity, preservation or infliction of hardship.

ii. Hardship inflicted or preserved. Others have focused on the hardships caused by inequality, rather than on inequality *per se.* (a) One implication of this focus is that we should not consider development to occur where hardships are not being reduced. As early as 1952, economist Jacob Viner considered whether "it is a paradox to claim that a country is achieving economic progress as long as the absolute extent of such ["crushing"] poverty has not lessened or even increased." He refrained, nevertheless, from adopting this as "a crucial test of the realization of economic development" because, if he did so, "I would be separating myself from the whole body of literature in this field."[28] Much had changed by the 1970s, when reduction of various hardships – unemployment, poverty, unmet needs – came to be advocated as the overarching goal of development programs. This advocacy was initiated by the International Labour Organization and taken up later by diverse forces within the World Bank. As one chronicler has described it, this period "should viewed as a major – some say unique – period of international co-operation directed at one central issue: attacking poverty."[29] Nevertheless, there were significant differences of opinion both on how best to conceptualize and measure poverty and on strategies for attacking it. The McNamara "redistribution with growth" approach was income-oriented and incrementalist, seeking to distribute new increments of national income to poor self-employed small producers both in rural and urban areas, so as gradually to expand their share of national income over time. The ILO approach called for setting minimum standards of living in each country, to be met by the end of the century, and to do this by "increasing the volume and productivity of employment". The basic needs approach championed by Paul Streeten and others contended, against the ILO approach, that the plight of the poor was not unemployment, it was being trapped in unremunerative work – in short, poverty. As against the income and inequality orientation of the World Bank's *Redistribution with Growth* and *Assault on Poverty* strategies, Streeten argued that "if policies are judged by the evident reduction of suffering, meeting basic needs scores better than reducing inequality."[30]

Other critics drew attention to hardships *inflicted* by narrowly growth-oriented models of development. Peter Berger observed that the Brazilian "economic miracle," which grew GNP by 54% and raised industrial production by 69% between 1964 and 1970, also impoverished its worst-off citizens both relatively and absolutely.[31] His criticism was not just of an imposition of inequality, but of an infliction of hardship and suffering: "The present critique of the Brazilian model is not that it is insufficiently egalitarian, but that it condones the starvation of children as an acceptable price for economic growth."[32]

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[28] Jacob Viner, *International Trade and Economic Development; Lectures Delivered at the National University of Brazil,* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1952), 126-127.
[29] Charles P. Oman and Ganeshan Wignaraja, *The Postwar Evolution of Development Thinking,* (New York: OECD Development Centre, and St. Martin's Press, 1994)
[30] Paul Streeten, Shahid Javed Burki, and Mahbub ul Haq, *First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in the Developing Countries,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 17-18.
[31] Peter Berger, *Pyramids of Sacrifice: Political Ethics and Social Change,* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 142-146.
[32] *Ibid.,* p. 146.

(iii) Entrenched social inequalities. The World Bank's "assault on poverty" strategy of the 1970s was primarily an assault on rural poverty, and "rural development" was conceived explicitly as aiming to reduce rural poverty: "The central concept of rural development presented here is of a process through which rural poverty is alleviated."[33] The redistribution with growth approach drew attention to other social and regional inequalities as well, by noting that "more than a decade of rapid growth in underdeveloped countries … has been very unequally distributed among countries, regions within countries, and socio-economic groups," adding that, as a result, "the very idea of aggregate growth as a social objective has increasingly been called into question."[34] Other inequalities were identity-based – e.g., along the lines of race, ethnicity, indigeneity, or gender. For the moment we will focus on gender, returning to race, ethnicity and indigenous peoples later in this chapter.

When viewed in 2005, the Gender Equality page on the UNDP website proclaimed, "Equality between women and men is a worthy goal that is central to progress in human development,"[35] recognizing that development, insofar as it is a worthy goal, must achieve greater equality for women. But this recognition was not won quickly or simply.

Prior to the 1970s neither women themselves nor issues about development's impact on women were well represented in development policy and planning institutions. Nevertheless, early researchers in this field were able to demonstrate not only that women did not share equally in the benefits of development, but, on the contrary, they had been subjected to increasing hardship. As one of them noted in 1975, in the developing world, "in virtually all countries and among all classes, women have lost ground relative to men; development, by widening the gap between incomes of men and women, has not helped improve women's lives, but rather has had an adverse impact upon them."[36] Following the pioneering research of Ester Boserup, this adverse impact was attributed initially to an undermining of women's traditional role in agriculture, as its modernization and commercialization gave advantages in technique, training, ownership and income to men. Meanwhile, withdrawal of men from household work increased the burden on women; among those who migrated to towns and cities, the double burden was aggravated by pressures to seek employment income, largely from the informal sector.[37]

The prevalent conception of gender inequity in development was in this early period three-fold: not only were (a) women excluded from benefits of development, but (b) development intensified their hardships; moreover, (c) women and women's issues were absent from decision-making, policy-making, and implementation in development

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[33] World Bank and Robert S. McNamara, *Assault on World Poverty; Problems of Rural Development, Education and Health,* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), 16-17.
[34] Chenery *et al.* p. xiii
[35] United Nations Development Programme, "Gender Equality," viewed 2005 12 08 at http://www.undp.org/gender/, New York, n.d.
[36] Irene Tinker, "The Adverse Imipact of Development on Women," in *Women and World Development*, eds. Irene Tinker and Michelle Bo Bramsen. Anonymous (New York: Praeger, 1976),
[37] Ester Boserup, *Women's Role in Economic Development,* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970); Irene Tinker and Michele Bo Bramsen eds., *Women and World Development,*Anonymous , American Association for the Advancement of Science, Seminar on Women in Development, Mexico City ed. (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1976); Irene Tinker ed., *Persistent Inequalities; Women and World Development,*Anonymous (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)

institutions. This conception of gender inequity, combined with the view that it could be overcome by improving women's access to education, credit, and the institutions of development, comprised the Women in Development perspective that gained considerable ground after 1975. As one participant-observer noted retrospectively, "The United Nations Decade for Women 1976-1985 heralded the acceptance of women's concerns as legitimate issues for national and international policy. How to integrate women in development became the subject of newly created offices in nearly every development agency."[38] Women's bureaus established within national governments pushed for adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.

On the other hand, strategies focussing on education and credit for women were having more limited success. Partly this has been attributed to a focusing of the impoverishing impacts of economic downturns and structural adjustment upon women in the 1980s, resulting in a "feminization of poverty."

However, attention has shifted increasingly towards social structures, roles, and policies that result in subordination of women, both within their families and within their wider communities and societies. Much earlier, declaratory recognition had already been given to the idea that reducing inequality between men and women should be a goal of development. The first international women's conference sponsored by the United Nations, held in Mexico City in 1975, included the following in its final resolution: "The primary objective of development being to bring about sustained improvement in the well-being of the individual and of society and to bestow benefits on all, development should be seen not only as a desirable goal in itself but also as the most important means for furthering equality of the sexes and the maintenance of peace." This was reiterated in the final report of the Nairobi conference of 1985 (par. 110), in which equality goals were far more explicitly spelled out. The final step in this thinking was to call for women's empowerment as an essential development goal, as the Fourth Conference did in its Declaration and Platform for Action, which is described in the first sentence of its mission statement as "an agenda for women's empowerment." (Platform par 1) Noting that growth can be highly inegalitarian, the Platform calls instead for "new alternatives that ensure that all members of society benefit from economic growth" and calls for "equality between women and men" to be achieved as an "aspect of development". Platform for Action, Par. 14. However, this acceptance of women's empowerment as critical value for development may have come at the price of muddying the meaning of 'empowerment'. Within the critical Gender and Development perspective, it meant "enabling women collectively to take control of their own lives to set their own agendas, to organise to help each other and make demands on the state for support and on society itself for change,"[39] – a more robust conception, certainly, than removing obstacles to income generation. Yet the latter has been rechristened as "empowerment" in more conservative quarters of the development world, where it is taken to mean

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[38] Irene Tinker, "A Context for the Field and for the Book," in *Persistent Inequalities; Women and World Development*, ed. Irene Tinker. Anonymous (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 4.

[39] Kate Young, *Planning Development with Women; Making a World of Difference,* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 158-159.

"entrepreneurial self-reliance" and any implications for broader social change are elided. Proponents of the human development approach have attempted to mediate this dispute in terms of capabilities. Freer access to markets may "enlarge choices" for some women in some circumstances, while participation in collective decision-making may do so for others.[40] Each can be empowering insofar as it increases "people's power to control their lives."[41] Both may also enhance women's "agency" (that is, the range of goals they value and are able to bring about).[42]

In short, as gender equity has become widely accepted as an essential value for development, its meaning has shifted – and remains a matter of contention. Initially it was recognized as maldevelopment that women did not share in the benefits of growth but rather suffered increased hardships because of it. This was supplanted by a stronger conception of gender equity holding that, if development is to be a worthy social goal, it must contribute to the empowerment of women, although agreement on this has come about in part by shifting some disagreement over to the meaning 'empowerment'.

Economic growth that is inequitable in either of these three ways may be considered maldevelopment, but for somewhat different reasons. First consider persistent social inequalities like those of gender. Differences in condition that men and women experience are far from neutral in impact on their ability to live the lives that they have reason to value. Disadvantages in safety, health, education, and earning power have obvious affects on well-being. If a public has a choice between a number of development paths, only some of which reduce these disadvantages, then, other things being equal, choosing any other path will reiterate, prolong and protract harms to women that could be avoided. Such a choice would be incompatible with the value of non-maleficence. Consequently such paths or strategies fall outside the scope of development as a worthy social goal, which, on the contrary, must be committed to removing social inequalities, like those of gender, that shelter one group from harmful disadvantages by shifting them onto the other. For the same reason, 'development' in this sense must be taken to exclude any processes of modernization or expansion that inflict or preserve hardships. This accounts for the second and third conceptions of equity as essential to development.

What then of the first sense of 'equitable development' – according to which all are to share in the benefits of development? This is vulnerable to two lines of criticism. (a) It would have been opposed by the growth strategies of the 1960s, which anticipated that inequality is increased early on in development and reduced only in the later stages. From this perspective, non-maleficence could be invoked to argue against equitable development, in the following way. Hardships would be only be prolonged if we are unwilling to sustain the increased inequalities that are endemic to early stages of growth and modernization; therefore, strictly equitable growth is not, after all, a socially worthy goal. This is an argument that drives a wedge between short-term inequality, growth, and long-term prospects for relieving hardships. However, it has been argued more recently that, although there can be short-term trade-offs between redistribution and growth,

[40] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1995; Gender and Human Development,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 114-115.
[41] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1993; People's Participation,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 21.
[42] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1995; Gender and Human Development,*

inequities also foster economic inefficiencies, and "greater equity can, over the long term, underpin faster growth."[43] If that is the case, then non-maleficent public choice will, without inconsistency, favour development paths in which the benefits of growth are shared so as to reduce hardships and deprivation of opportunity. (b) The idea that at least some benefits of growth should be shared throughout a society, even by those already advantaged, could also be questioned. The human development perspective responds that enlarging choices available to persons in any social position is fundamentally a good thing as long as priority is given to reducing and eliminating deprivations, compared to what is feasible at the time. Maldevelopment consists not in raising life expectancies for the rich, but in failing to match them for everyone else.

3. Participation and empowerment

The need for development to be participatory – to include stakeholders in development decision-making – came to be recognized slowly as new strategies unfolded to replace the strategy of rapid but inequitable growth. Development-as-growth strategies were also characterized by top-down decision-making structures controlled by international institutions in conjunction with national governments; expert planners regarded themselves as accountable primarily to national governments but were clearly aware of requirements by international funders that had to be satisfied. Wider popular participation was "normally restricted to some hastily organized meetings in which outside experts 'brief' local people about the objectives and activities of the projects."[44] The Basic Needs approach in particular favoured small-scale projects that targeted the poor, especially in rural areas. Self-help and participatory decision-making were used to engage the knowledge and creativity of local people. In part this may have been done because of an emphasis on using socially and environmentally appropriate technologies,[45] but on the other hand projects of this type may simply be less likely to succeed if they do not engage the knowledge and motivation of local people. Arguably "participation by the people in the selection, design and management of social and economic projects and programmes" is one a few "central elements, the absence of any one of which is likely to lead to disappointment with the ultimate results"[46] for the wider redistributive strategies of which they are part. However, this was experience that grew out of attempts to implement basic needs strategies, and participatory development is not mentioned in the major policy documents advocating redistribution with growth or the basic needs approach. More commonly, the theoretical debates of the period focused on whether development and its decision-making should be centralized or decentralized, centre-down or bottom-up.[47]

There was also a lack of clarity in the 1970s and 1980s whether, if stakeholder

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[43] World Bank, *World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development,* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005), 17.
[44] John Brohman, *Popular Development; Rethinking the Theory and Practice of Development,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), 202.
[45] *Ibid.,* p. 204.
[46] Keith Griffin, *Alternative Strategies for Economic Development,* 2nded. (New York: St. Martin's Press, in association with OECD Development Centre, 1999), 188-189.
[47] Walter Stohr and D. R. Fraser Taylor, *Development from Above or Below? The Dialectics of Regional Planning in Developing Countries,* (New York: Jphn Wiley & Sons, 1981)

participation in development decision-making was to be valued at all, it was to be valued for its own sake or merely as a means contributing to the success of development projects and strategies. This had a bearing on the degree and extent of participation to be implemented. 'Participation' was used loosely to cover a wide spectrum of types of engagement.[48] It could be called 'participation' if local people were consulted even if their views had no influence on decision-makers. Others would use 'participation' to mean that local people worked for a project, a criterion so elastic as to include the Egyptian slaves as participants in the construction of the pyramids. At the other end of the spectrum, other instances of participation would involve stakeholders forming sustainable organizations that not only shared in management of an initial project, but kept these resources under their control, while seeking and acquiring further resources to develop subsequent projects. In cases where local organizations and movements have sought this stronger, more autonomous sort of participation as an explicit political goal, they have not infrequently met with resistance if not repression from states or local elites.[49] Moreover, in cases where participation is regarded merely as a means to development, it is the weaker forms that are likely to be employed, whereas stronger forms of participation are more likely to be employed when it is advocated for its own sake.[50]

One of the first voices to argue for the intrinsic value of participatory development was Denis Goulet, who in 1971 proposed that all people "are entitled to become agents, not mere beneficiaries, of their own development."[51] Goulet's conception of agency here overlaps with the idea of having control or influence over one's well-being and development, even though (as is likely) one is not the *sole agent* of it, and it shares this core meaning with the idea of empowerment, which has been used more frequently used in this context in recent years. The value, then, is not participation *per se,* but agency or empowerment; what is valuable is not the number of meetings that people may attend, but whether, by doing so, they achieve greater agency, influence, or control over their development. Twenty years after Goulet, *Human Development Report 1993* proclaimed, "Any proposal to increase people's participation must therefore pass the empowerment test – does it increase or decrease people's power to control their lives?"[52] Empowerment, too, can be valued either for its own sake or for its effects;[53] nevertheless, the intrinsic value of having control over one's life is far more plausible than the intrinsic value of participation in decision-making, much less the intrinsic value of decentralized versus centralized decision-making.

While this dual value of empowerment would seem to be a strength, it also poses

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[48] John Gaventa, "The Scaling-up and Institutionalizing of PRA: Lessons and Challenges," in *Who Changes? Institutionalizing Participation in Development*, eds. James Blackburn and Jeremy Holland. Anonymous (London: Intermediate Technology, 1998), 153-166.
[49] Brohman, pp. 273-74.
[50] Caroline Moser, "Mobilization is Women's Work; Struggles for Infrastructure in Guayquil, Ecuador," in *Women, Human Settlements, and Housing*, eds. Caroline Moser and Linda Peake. Anonymous (London: Tavistock, 1987), 14.
[51] D. Goulet, *The Cruel Choice,* (New York: Atheneum, 1971), 148.
[52] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1993; People's Participation,* 21.
[53] Deepa Narayan-Parker ed., *Measuring Empowerment: Cross-disciplinary Perspectives,* Anonymous (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2005)

a difficulty. If we value empowerment for its own sake, that means we value it as a component of a good life. Thus, comparing two life-paths which are identical in all other ways, except that in one the scope of how we can live and what we can achieve is not under our own control, we would have to say that the other life path, in which we do have such control, is a better life – if we regard such control as intrinsically valuable. On the other hand, empowerment can also be valued as a means of self-defense against the imposition or prolongation of hardships. What is the proper balance between them? If non-maleficence is our primary value, then we should want to avoid giving people too little room for choice (individually or publicly) to have a good life. But it does not follow from this that we must protect every choice for everyone. Lack of choice and control, *per se*, is not the only hardship that a person can encounter. Therefore, if we wish to minimize harm, we should not want to protect one person's choice and control where it undermines others' choice and control to fend off hardships. In other words, specific freedoms by which we protect ourselves against hardships take priority over generic freedom, and having too little generic freedom is just one hardship among many. Let us call this principle "the priority of protective empowerment."

Therefore, if non-maleficence is the ethical trump card, empowerment can be regarded as an intrinsic value of development, but only if priority is given protective empowerment. Insofar as development is a worthy social goal, it enhances empowerment and reduces empowerment deprivation; programs and projects of social and economic expansion that fail to do this can be regarded as maldevelopment.

This, however, introduces some further complexities. Participation in development decision-making is not the only form that empowerment can take. *Human Development Report 2003* argues that including project stakeholders in decision-making is not the only form of empowerment, which they extend to household participation, economic participation, and social and cultural participation, along with political participation. Accordingly people can be disempowered by exclusion from markets (including labour markets) or civil society as well as by exclusion from governance. Still, this broadening may be appropriate for a number of reasons. One is that this expanded conception of participation fits well with the way in which participation was recognized independently by the Declaration on the Right to Development, which not only affirms that "The human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development" but further stipulates that "development must take place on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development."[54] No distinction is drawn between amongst participation in governance or economic, civic, social, or cultural activities.

4. Human rights

From time to time it has been contended that there is a trade-off between development and the enjoyment of human rights, that development needs outweigh the niceties of human rights, or that full implementation of human rights is an impediment to the sort of rapid development that less-developed economies require in order to meet the needs of their people. The consensus within the development community is to reject these contentions. There are empirical as well as ethical reasons for doing so.

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[54] United Nations, General Assembly, *Declaration on the Right to Development,*Anonymous , 1986)

Amartya Sen has put forward some of the empirical reasons, including a lack of correlation between human rights restrictions and rapid development, as well as observations that in a public sphere where information flows rapidly through a free press, governments seeking re-election respond more quickly to life-threatening crises, such as potential famines.[55]

The ethical reasons include cross-cultural support for protecting people in the ways that human rights prescribe.[56] As Drydyk has argued, the values of all cultures can be expected to evolve toward support of human rights if their application is steered and selected by common-sense recognition of the harm and hardships that come from failing to protect people's hold on the substance of these rights – on health, shelter, education, employment, an adequate standard of living, non-discriminatory treatment, rule of law, free speech, and participation in civil and political life.[57]

Further arguments for recognizing human rights can be made on the basis of the three values that we have already discussed as components of the development ethics framework: well-being, equity, and empowerment. However, valuing human rights also adds to the framework and is not reducible to the previous three values. This point – that adding human rights as a fourth value is supported by the first three yet is not reducible to them – deserves closer examination, beginning with well-being and equity.

Insofar as the values of human well-being and equity delineate maldevelopment from ethically acceptable development, they are thereby also calling for more equal enjoyment of social and economic rights. For instance, economic expansion is maldevelopment if it imposes or fails to relieve hardships. In human rights language, these hardships would fall naturally under such rubrics as employment (Article 23), education (Article 26), or, in the omnibus Article 23, "a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being," as well as "security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood." In saying that humans are entitled to employment, education, and an adequate and secure standard of living, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* is saying it is wrong for people to be denied these things either by the action or by the inaction of other individuals, communities, organizations, institutions, or governments. The values of development ethics come to a similar conclusion, though limited to the context of development, namely, that it is wrong for people to suffer hardships in these ways by action or omission on the part of development enterprises. In other words, the upshot of these two values in the context of

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[55] Amartya Sen, "Human Rights and Economic Achievements," in *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, eds. Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell. Anonymous (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 88-99.

[56] *Ibid.* See also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, *Towards and Islamic Reformation; Civil Liberties, Human Rights, and International Law,* (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1990); Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im and Francis Mading Deng eds., *Human rights in Africa: Cross-cultural Perspectives,*Anonymous (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1990), 399.; Charles Taylor, "Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights," in *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, eds. Joanne Bauer and Daniel Bell. Anonymous (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 124-144.; Abou El Fadl, Khaled, *Islam and the Challenge of Democracy,* eds. Joshua Cohen and Deborah Chasman (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004)

[57] Jay Drydyk, "Globalization and Human Rights " in *Moral Issues in Global Perspective*, ed. Christine Koggel. Anonymous (Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 1999), 30-42.

development is that development must enhance rather than diminish people's enjoyment of social and economic rights.

Valuing well-being and equity in development entails being critical of development efforts that impose inadequate standards of living, either by impoverishing people or missing opportunities to relieve hardships. The human right to an adequate standard of living can be more critical still, critical not just of what actually occurring development efforts do or fail to do, but critical also of the extent of actually occurring development efforts, as to whether they are *extensive enough*. In principle the right to an adequate standard of living is extremely demanding, calling for as much to be done as can be done in equalizing people's effective entitlements to essential components of standard of living, including shelter, food, clothing, medical and social services. We do not need a precise standard for "adequacy" of living standards to judge vast disparities unacceptable, and in this way useful benchmarks can be set. For instance, we do not need to agree on criteria for an adequate standard of living in order to agree on the Millenium Development Goals as minimal benchmarks for progress in realizing this right, just as we do not need to agree on criteria for "adequate education" in order to accept the MDGs as minimal benchmarks for realizing the right to education. What the human rights framework adds to development ethics is to set upward harmonization as a universal, worldwide goal; at the same time, it postpones debate about the meaning of "adequacy" as a final endpoint; yet it may also set provisional standards, by which we can assess whether enough development of the right kinds has been carried out. When, as seems inevitable, the world fails to meet the MDGs, the conclusion will be that there was more than enough economic expansion, but not enough development of the right kinds. In this way human rights provide a unique *global* standard for maldevelopment.

Now consider empowerment, the third value we have seen unfold so far in the emerging development ethics framework. While empowerment is a reason for supporting human rights, and indeed the value of human rights points to a further value that has also come to delineate maldevelopment from development as a worthy social goal.

On one hand, civil and political rights are necessary means for achieving empowerment. The idea that empowerment can be achieved and sustained without protection of human rights is refuted by historical experience, not only from pre-1990 socialist countries and less wealthy countries where civic and political rights were inadequately protected, but also in richer countries where weak social and economic rights have disempowered racial and other minorities. The rights-based development model articulated in *Human Development Report 2000* calls for active utilization of civil and political rights in order to push for progress in realizing social, economic and cultural rights. The *Report* observes that, in some developing countries, while electoral systems are formally democratic, they are sometimes made to function in ways that exclude ethnic or racial minorities or women from full participation in political life and decision-making. If the values of equity and empowerment are to be realized in these circumstances, the political systems must be made more inclusive. Human rights serve this purpose well, both as legal instruments and as rallying-cries, since their essential universality so clearly contradicts autocracy and political exclusion.[58] The *Report* also

[58] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2000; Human Rights and Human Development,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)

recognizes that typically rights are not realized without struggles and pressure from below, and the realization of social and economic rights to employment, education, and adequate and secure food, shelter, clothing, medical and social services is no exception. Pressing for realization of social and economic rights necessarily involves exercising civil and political rights to free speech, association, and electoral participation, and often it requires expanding the effective scope of these rights to "enlarge the political space."[59] In these various ways, human rights are valuable as means to achieving the other values of development – well-being, equity, and empowerment.

On the other hand, including human rights as a value of development has implications that go beyond this. One is that participation, expression and association are not valuable merely in and for development; rather everyone has reason to value their own freedom and opportunity for participation, expression and association, not only in economic and political life but in personal, social, and cultural life as well. People are denied such freedom when they are excluded on the basis of their identity or mode of living from economic, political, social or cultural activity within their society. If we recognize these forms of exclusion as inequitable, then we must recognize the independent value of cultural freedom, argued *Human Development Report 2004,* to which we will return in section 7, below. For the moment we introduce this merely to illustrate that participation, expression, and association are valuable not merely in development, nor merely as means, and if they are therefore to be regarded as ends of development, then human rights must be included as independent values of development, not merely as means to achieving other development values.

The idea that implementation of human rights is an essential value for development was proclaimed a decade earlier in the Declaration on the Right to Development. The Declaration further links development and other human rights as a matter of principle by defining the development *to which* we have this right as *including* improved conditions for the exercise of human rights: it is the "inalienable right by virtue of which every human person and all peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized."[60] It is understood implicitly in human rights doctrine that every right must be harmonized with every other, and this indivisibility and interdependence of economic rights with others is reiterated in Article 6, which adds that "States should take steps to eliminate obstacles to development resulting from failure to observe civil and political rights, as well as economic social and cultural rights."

Conceptually, we might say that human rights have great appetites for duties. That is, once we reach ethical agreement that there is a human right to X, it is incumbent on us to work out a division of responsibilities to see to it that everyone's access to X is respected (*i.e.,* not interfered with), protected (against interference), provided for, and promoted. Owing to the universality of human rights and the complexity of world political geography, this division of responsibilities will involve cooperation between states, international institutions, multilateral and regional organizations, and non-state parties. In relation to development, then, a human rights perspective introduces the

[59] *Ibid.,* pp. 75-76, 85-88.
[60] Declaration on the Right to Development, Article 1.

additional ethical demand for a system of international cooperation and concerted action to avoid maldevelopment and to meet global development goals. This demand is enunciated in the *Declaration on the Right to Development.*[61] Subsequently the Secretary General appointed a Special Expert on Realizing the Right to Development to develop a model for international cooperation and finance that might meet this demand and also meet with the approval and support of member states. The Special Expert, Dr. Arjun Sengupta, has produced a model, relying on multilateral development compacts matching commitments of development financing with commitments to meet targets in realizing of civil, political, social and economic rights. However, progress in obtaining support amongst member states has not been rapid. Still, the idea that some such system allocating development responsibilities must be worked out remains no less sound, for all that, as an ethical idea. Accordingly we include it as an implication of valuing human rights within the development ethics framework.

What it means, then, to value human rights within this framework is threefold. First, it means that achieving economic expansion by means that diminish people's enjoyment of human rights is maldevelopment; this includes maldevelopment that proceeds by means of discrimination. Secondly, it means that the goals of development must include enhanced enjoyment of all human rights, including the civil and political as well as the social, economic, and cultural; hence, failing to enhance enjoyment of these rights, where they could have been enhanced, is a second modality of maldevelopment. Finally there are implications on the global scale. Valuing welfare rights as development values means that we go beyond setting standards for actually occurring development to setting global goals *for* world development. And as we have just seen there are implications for international cooperation. Thus development ethics comes to be "globalized", so to speak, as its purview is lifted from the level of particular development projects but to the level of development activity as a whole on the global scale. This brings to light two further dimensions of maldevelopment: failing to meet global development goals, and being unable to meet such goals for lack of effective international cooperation.

5. Cultures and identities

Ethically unfettered economic projects and growth have also been criticized in various ways for their impacts on cultures and identities. In some cases modernization was seen to devalue of local cultures, while in others it was criticized for manipulating identity-based rivalries or hierarchies. In this section we will initially consider how economic growth and expansion may constitute maldevelopment by reason of cultural or identity-based impositions and exclusions; the underlying value, we will argue, can be understood as *cultural freedom.* These sorts of impositions and exclusions also characterize the kind of maldevelopment to which indigenous peoples have been subjected; however, this maldevelopment has further features that need to be considered separately, and we turn to these at the end of the section.

(a) Depreciation and exclusion

As early as 1949 orthodox economists began comment on "demonstration effects"

[61] United Nations, General Assembly, *Declaration on the Right to Development,*

of consumption patterns in high-income countries on lower-income countries. Despite large income differences, "consumers in the latter often seek to emulate consumption standards in the rich countries."[62] Later dependency theorists also took note of this and argued (though for different reasons) that the phenomenon was economically stultifying for the lower-income countries. Celso Furtado concluded that "these consumption patterns … and the rigid social structures (erected under colonialism) that lie behind them … constitute 'the central mechanism of dependence'."[63]

These economic and political criticisms were supplemented by ethical criticisms. Denis Goulet portrayed it as irresponsible for "entrepreneurs to tamper with people's desire mechanisms before they have learned to resist the manipulative blandishments of need-creation" [64] and to "have tampered irreversibly with people's desires before endowing economic systems with the ability to satisfy new demands."[65] But Goulet made a deeper criticism of consumerism within development: it tended not only to challenge but to overwhelm and undermine people's confidence in their own ability to know independently what they value for their own reasons. "The danger of losing core values," he thought, "was not imaginary." On the contrary, "harmful images of the good life are disseminated throughout the world by ideological and commercial propaganda, unexamined demonstration effects, and cultural transfers of all types." The result, he argued, was "anti-development", as these transferred values "proved to be trivial or dehumanizing."[66] Goulet was also concerned that "development processes release social forces whose cumulative effect is to standardize tastes, behaviour, and institutions" and thus undermine cultural diversity, which, he thought, would be damaging to expression of identities, cultural esteem, and quality of life.[67]

Many of these themes have been elaborated more recently by "anti-development" thinkers such as Arturo Escobar, Gustavo Esteva, Wolfgang Sachs, and others.[68] Adapting Michel Foucault's approach to power and knowledge, they attempt to describe development "discourse" as a combination of ideas and values with development practices. At both levels, development discourse is an imposition upon local communities from more powerful actors outside. Their critique is more sweeping than Goulet's, for they hold that it is not merely rich countries' standards of consumption that entrap people from other countries, but the idea of development itself, and especially the distinction between development and underdevelopment. Even if 'development' is taken

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[62] Oman and Wignaraja, *The Postwar Evolution of Development Thinking,* 18-19., citing J. S. Duesenberry, *Income, Saving and the Theory of Consumer Behaviour,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949); R. Nurske, "Some International Aspects of the Problem of Economic Development," *American Economic Review* (1952)

[63] Celso Furtado, *Developmeent and Underdevelopment,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), cited in Oman and Wignaraja, *The Postwar Evolution of Development Thinking,* 158.

[64] Goulet, *The Cruel Choice,* 210.

[65] *Ibid.,* p. 223.

[66] *Ibid.,* p. 219.

[67] *Ibid.,* pp. 264-265.

[68] See Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development; The Making and Unmaking of the Third World,* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995); Gustavo Esteva, "Development," in , ed. Wolfgang Sachs. Anonymous (London: Zed Books, 1992), 6-25.; Wolfgang Sachs ed., *The Development Dictionary; A Guide to Knowledge and Power,*Anonymous (London: Zed Books, 1992); Bill Cooke and Uma Kothari eds., *Participation: The New Tyranny?*Anonymous (London: Zed Books, 2001)

in its broadest meaning as 'favorable change', it invites people to depreciate themselves as "underdeveloped" and to abandon local self-understanding in a desperate search for improvement. Thus "for two-thirds of the people on earth, this positive meaning of the word 'development' … is a reminder of *what they are not.* ...To escape from it, they need to be enslaved to others' experiences and dreams."[69] The conception of social improvement that development offers is not based on local thought, culture, values, and experience, and therefore it is bound to be highly distortive. Worse, by accepting the conceptual framework of development, local people submit to the agendas of more powerful countries and institutions.

This line of thought yields an anti-development perspective. Development discourse should not be changed but abandoned, replaced by a post-development discourse. The rationale for making such a break is that critical development thinking is considered to be futile, since development discourse is "a net of significances in which the person who uses it is irremediably trapped."[70] This prediction, however, has been contradicted by a flourishing outburst of critical development thought led by the human development perspective and the capabilities approach. These perspectives hold "development" activities – whatever they may be – accountable for enlarging the choices and capabilities that people have their own good reasons for valuing. This is to say that local people will have their own good reasons for whether and what to accept or expect of development activities offered either by their own compatriots or by outsiders. The human development and capabilities approaches acknowledge that, when local people become aware of outsiders' ways of life, they may have new choices to make about how their own ways of life – *i.e.,* choices as to how they should change and how they should remain the same. But what is the most important issue about such choices? Is it that they should never have been occasioned? Or is it that people within their communities should not be compelled or bullied to accept either tradition or change, that they should be able to reach their own conclusions for their own good reasons? While anti-development thinkers favour the former, human development and capabilities advocates favour the latter, and so they place high value on *cultural freedom.*

Cultural freedom was advocated prominently by the World Commission on Culture and Development in 1995. Its final report, *Our Creative Diversity,* proceeds from the principle that culture cannot be regarded merely as a means to economic growth or material progress, it must be included among the ends of development "seen as the flourishing of human existence."[71] It also urged that various aspects of this principle needed to be balanced. On one hand, it is wrong for some cultures to be dominated by others. On the other hand, the Commission also opposed the "excessively conservationist" interpretation of this principle to mean that cultures should not change but should be preserved. It also acknowledged that modern as well as traditional cultures may contain repressive elements that *need* to be changed. However, the report somewhat obscured the relations between groups and individuals by claiming that cultural freedom is not an individual freedom but a group freedom that protects individuals, creative change, and freedom to think about what one has reason to value.

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[69] Esteva, *Development,* 10.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] World Commission on Culture and Development, Anonymous (Paris: UNESCO, 1995)

A decade later, the value of cultural freedom was given a clearer theoretical footing in *Human Development Report 2004.* The focal idea in this report is *identity.* It is acknowledged that identity combines group memberships and personal choices in very complex ways. Choosing who we wish to be involves choosing how to associate with groups, and we are already group members if and when we make these choices. While no one is free of their beginnings, no one is entirely made to be who they will become, either. What carries the ethical weight here is the idea that making choices requires having choices, and there are a number of ways in which cultural freedom can be unduly restricted. "Participation exclusion" occurs when people are excluded in any degree from economic, social, political, or cultural life on the basis of who they are. This includes discrimination and marginalization on the basis of gender, ethnicity, race, religion, or, more broadly, cultural affiliation. Participation exclusion is distinguished from "living mode exclusion." This "second kind of cultural exclusion denies recognition of a lifestyle that a group would choose to have, and this intolerance goes with the insistence that members of the group must live exactly like others in the society."[72] Some examples of living mode exclusion are homophobia, intolerance of religious lifestyles (including clothing), and "insistence that immigrants give up their traditional lifestyles and adopt the dominant lifestyle in the society to which they have immigrated."[73] The report also acknowledges the exclusionary effects of globalized pop-culture industries, in response to which it calls for local alternatives to be supported constructively within countries.

The underlying value, in this approach, is that people should have both liberty and real opportunity to *be who they are and who they want to be.* To realize this value, strategies of inclusion are required. Economic inclusion might require anti-discrimination or affirmative action measures, or targeted investments; social inclusion might aim for equal access to health care or education, including minority language education; political inclusion might require various types of guaranteed group representation, such as reserved electoral seats or asymmetrical federalism; cultural inclusion may require not only passive toleration but public investment in diverse alternative cultural productions, and public forms of recognition for traditions and their creative contemporary elaboration.

This focus on identity makes it clearer why cultural freedom should be included as a value of development. Imagine advocating a form or process of development in which cultural freedom had no importance. That would permit identity-based exclusion and discrimination, which is inconsistent with the human rights values by which development is bound. But does cultural freedom have no independent value for development? Perhaps for another species, but not for us. Human flourishing seems inevitably to involve self-realization, which in turn is bound up with belonging with other people, sharing values, being supported and respected. It is because of these complex connections between self, belonging, and human flourishing that social depreciation and exclusion are harmful. If we care that development should not cause avoidable harm, then the development we want must not create or preserve social depreciation or exclusion. Types of development to which these effects are unimportant are types of

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[72] United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2004; Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 14.
[73] *Ibid.*

development to which human flourishing is not important, and these types of "development" are not worth having.

(b) Indigenous peoples

Indigenous peoples have been harmed by maldevelopment in every way imaginable. Contact with settlers and developers has damaged their well-being, treated them inequitably, disempowered them, denied and violated their human rights, and subjected them to systematic abuse and defamation, not to mention exclusion. So, given that their treatment has violated every development value that we have so far considered, what more needs to be said? In fact, the maltreatment of indigenous peoples has two further dimensions.

One is particularly germane to displacement. Colonization has always reduced indigenous peoples' effective claims on land, sometimes by outright denial of their land rights. If this is maldevelopment, then what is the link between land and other development values? Although it is risky to generalize about indigenous peoples, and indeed the category of "indigenous" is not uncontested, still, one common distinguishing feature is that they have cultures which link their well-being to an extraordinarily high degree with their traditional lands.[74] This link has come to be recognized in international law, even where its legal ramifications are still under negotiation. Convention 169 of the International Labour Organization (1989) commits signatories to "respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use, and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship."[75] Similarly, "the special relationship that the indigenous peoples maintain with their lands, territories, and resources" is recognized in the 2003 draft of an American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations, which has entered final negotiations through the Organization of American States. Most significantly, the draft also recognizes, "that for the indigenous peoples their traditional collective forms of ownership and use of lands, territories, resources, waters, and coastal zones are a necessary conditions for their survival, social organization, development, spirituality, and individual and collective well-being."[76] Recognition of indigenous peoples' land rights is an important value because the effects of denying or minimizing these rights have been extraordinarily damaging for their material and cultural survival and well-being.

Similar links can be made out between maldevelopment and indigenous peoples' self-governance and self-determination. Claims of peoples' rights to self-determination have had an odd and inconsistent history[77] that may undermine the credibility of the general idea. From 1648 such rights were intended as security rights of sovereign states; opportunities to redraw the map of Europe after the First World War led to redefinition of

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[74] S. James Anaya, *Indigenous Peoples in International Law,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 104-107.

[75] International Labour Organisation, *Convention (No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,*Anonymous , 1989)

[76] Organization of American States, *Consolidated Text of the Draft Declaration Prepared by the Chair of the Working Group,* trans. Working Group to Prepare the Proposed American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Populations., 2003)

[77] Diane Orentlicher, "Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-spearatist Claims," *Yale Journal of International Law* 23 (1998): 1.

'peoples' along ethnic lines, and the 'right' was a mandate for drawing state boundaries along ethnic lines. The 'right of peoples to self-determination' acquired an entirely new meaning during the period of decolonization after 1948, for now the 'peoples' of Africa and the Indian subcontinent were generally multi-ethnic. Nevertheless, the rights of peoples to self-determination has been reasserted in the Declaration on the Right to Development.[78] Indigenous people and their advocates have argued that depriving their communities of self-determination, , including self-governance in matters of development and resource use, will have continued ill effects on their material and cultural well-being and that such self-governance and self-determination are essential forms of empowerment for them. Hence they have pushed for inclusion in the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples the principle that "Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development,"[79] backed concretely by specific entitlement to self-government (Article 31) and control over resources (Article 26).

Implicit here is a social and historical premise with important ethical conclusions. It is that historic and continued denial of indigenous peoples' rights to land, resources, and self-determination have inevitably subjected them to violations of the values of human well-being and security, equity, empowerment, and cultural freedom. Denial of land, resource control, and self-determination is the specific modus of maldevelopment that has been imposed on these specific peoples. For that reason, the corresponding rights of indigenous peoples should be regarded as development values applying to these specific peoples.

6. Environmental sustainability

Ethical concerns over environmental degradation gained a degree of public recognition at the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment. Human well-being was a prominent value in the Stockholm Declaration, combined with the rueful observation that it can be damaged as well as enhanced by human powers to transform the environment (par. 1). However, at the centre of the Declaration we find only the weak conservationist "responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations."

Fifteen years later a stronger and more complex principle received international recognition by the World Commission on Environment and Development. The Brundtland commission argued that poverty was both a cause and an effect of environmental degradation, and, therefore, a new path of development was required to address both. This was the path of "sustainable development," which the Commission defined as development that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the

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[78] Margot E. Salomon and Arjun Sengupta, *The Right to Development: Obligations of States and the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples,* (London: Minority Rights Group International, 2003), 35.
[79] United Nations and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,* trans. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities., 1994)

ability of future generations to meet their own needs."[80] "Meeting needs of present" meant poverty reduction and growth with equity. "Without compromising … future generations" meant slowing population growth and reforming high-consumption lifestyles." The striking move made by the Brundtland Commission was to affirm the *development* values of human well-being, human security, and equity – focusing on poverty reduction – as central *environmental* values. Recognizing present impoverishment as a driving *cause* of environmentally damaging growth, they invoked

future impoverishment as a *criterion* for unacceptable environmental damage, neatly tied to present consumption by the idea of justice between generations.

Development thinkers predominantly adopt this conception of sustainable development rather than challenging it. The human development approach replaces Brundtland's 'needs' talk with the principle that sustainable development expands the choices of present generations without reducing the choices of future generations. But this is a modification rather than a challenge to the main point of sustainable development, namely: that environmental protection is valued as a necessary condition for reducing human hardships equitably across generations.

This conception of sustainability is subject to attack on two fronts. Some have argued that the very idea of sustainability is misleading in the context of market economies, whose dynamics are hostile to all of the goals of sustainability – poverty reduction, equity, resource and ecosystem protection, and reform of high-consumption lifestyles. Thus Wolfgang Sachs has argued that the idea of sustainability merely sugar-coats the idea of development without effectively changing the reality.[81] Others have argued that sustainable development is not a strong enough value, for what needs protecting, ethically speaking, is not merely the human well-being or security or choice that environmental conditions afford, but something else: arguably animal welfare, or ecosystem health or integrity, or species, or the integrity, simplicity, and beauty of the land. On these views, the problem with Brundtland-type conceptions of sustainability is that they are anthropocentric and fail to protect or respect what is valuable about the environment *apart from* its value to humans.[82]

So far, these views have not made great inroads in development circles, and there are probably two broad reasons why they have not. Regarding the anti-development view that 'sustainable development' is an oxymoron, there is scepticism as to whether there are any "post-development" alternatives that could be protect people more successfully against insecure and inequitable living conditions while protecting environments against degradation. For this reason, many would conclude that giving up on development would entail giving up on development values such as human well-being, human security, and equity. In response to arguments that morality requires higher standards for the environment, valuing some non-human parts or aspects of it for their own sakes, there is also scepticism. While there is interest these values and respect for people who practice

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[80] World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 8.

[81] Wolfgang Sachs, "Environment," in *The Development Dictionary; A Guide to Power and Knowledge*, ed. Wolfgang Sachs. Anonymous (London: Zed Books, 1993), 26-37.

[82] For a survey of non-anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics, see, for instance: Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III eds., *Environmental Ethics: An Anthology,*Anonymous (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002)

them, few are convinced that animal welfare, or species, or the integrity, simplicity, and beauty of the land are things that *everyone* has reason to value *as highly* as they value their own well-being, security, and equity. It may be acknowledged that values like these should not be violated in the extreme (abusing animals, wantonly eradicating species, paving paradise), but it would certainly not be accepted that meeting these environmental values to any high degree should take priority over development values, especially human security and equity.

The capability approach attempts to close the gap between development values and environmental values in an interesting way. Environmental values could be construed as commitments that people value independently, not just for the sake of their own well-being, more narrowly construed. For people who shared those values, exercising care and respect for nature as they conceive it would constitute one aspect of living well. Thus being capable of living with care and respect for nature would be a capability they have reason to value. Martha Nussbaum has included "Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature" on her list of ten central human capabilities, although she notes that "in terms of cross-cultural development, this has been the most controversial item on the list."[83] The capability approach would then call for removing shortfalls in this capability; however, this would need to be done in ways that harmonize with other capabilities that people have reason to value.

This provides a second way in which to regard unsustainability as a criterion of maldevelopment. According to the intergenerational criterion advocated by the Brundtland Commission, unsustainability means either failing to meet the needs of the present or, through environmental degradation, failing to meet the needs of future generations. The human development approach targeted levels of environmental damage that would restrict the choices of future generations. The capability approach highlights acting with concern for the environment as a valuable functioning and capability; it calls for removing shortfalls in this along with all other capabilities that people have reason to value. This yields a broader criterion of environmental maldevelopment as growth and expansion that are conducted without respect or care for the environment – and, including the criterion of sustainability – especially if this lack of respect or care for the environment results in capability shortfalls for present or future generations.

Between this sort of maldevelopment, then, and development strategies that do respect and care for the environment, what guidance do we receive from the value of non-maleficence? Of course it demands that we avoid environmental malpractice that is damaging to human welfare, present or future. Does it demand that we care intrinsically about the well-being of other organisms, ecosystems, and nature as a whole? We can perhaps sidestep some thorny philosophy if, as Nussbaum suggests, we regard concern for them as an aspect of living well, for in that case doing damage to them is doing harm to ourselves, and so once again non-maleficence *towards humans* cautions us to avoid environmental maldevelopment.

[83] Nussbaum, *Women and Human Development; The Capabilities Approach,* 80.

7. Conclusions

These six development values do not make up an ethical doctrine or a normative political theory. They are not precise enough for that; they certainly give us nothing like an algorithm or rule book for ethical decision-making. Their vagueness, however is part of their strength. From a variety of ethical or political perspectives, we can agree that development must enhance human well-being and security, equity, and so on, while leaving room for disagreement, debate, and creative elaboration on exactly what well-being, security, and equity require in particular development contexts. The other part of their strength derives from their justifiability on the basis of the universal and ethically indispensable value of non-maleficence. Development is not a worthy social goal if it inflicts avoidable harm. Specifically, strategies and projects are not worth pursuing if they increase or fail to reduce hardships or insecurity or entrenched social inequalities or exclusions, if they deprive people of decision-making powers by which to protect themselves against these ills, if they do not enhance respect, protection, provision and promotion of human rights, if they do not contribute towards meeting global development goals, or if they enlist people to treat their environments with lack of care and concern. If we value non-maleficence, we have reason to regard such strategies and projects as maldevelopment and, accordingly, to avoid them.

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